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CONVERGING PSB POLICIES IN 
WESTERN EUROPE: THE NETHERLANDS
AND FLANDERS COMPARED
JO L. H. BARDOEL AND LEEN D’HAENENS1
Both European politics and public broadcasting are in the middle of a process of
reinventing the concept of public service broadcasting and to reconsider to what
extent the existing institutions are still serving the idea of public service
broadcasting as it was formulated over 80 years ago. Against the background of
liberalizing EU and national policies together with rapidly changing societies, it
is hypothesized that national broadcasting policies and practices in Europe will
converge towards a more unified western and liberal broadcasting model.
Therefore, this article will analyze the political debate and policy development vis-
à-vis public service broadcasting currently generated in two neighboring contexts:
Flanders and the Netherlands. The article digs into the diverging arguments of
governments, regulators and broadcasters that are at stake on the future PSB remit,
e.g. the mission and program task, organization, and financing mechanisms.
Comparing recent debates and policy making in both countries the article
concludes that, despite very different national traditions, there indeed seems to be
a certain convergence of public broadcasting policies in Flanders and the
Netherlands in recent years.
Keywords: Public service broadcasting, PSB mission, PSB program, PSB funding,
media systems, convergence, Flanders, Netherlands, EU
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The traditionally (all too) close relationship between public broadcasters and national
politics seems to become more distant and problematic, parallel to the audience, which
leaves behind public broadcasters in favor of their commercial competitors. Against this
reality, this article will analyze the political debate and policy development currently
generated in two neighboring contexts where over the past decades very different stances
have been taken with regard to public broadcasting. The article will dig into the issues at
stake on the future PSB remit, e.g., its mission and program task, its organization and
financing mechanisms. Applying Hallin & Mancini’s recent typology of media systems in
Western democracies (2004) as a comparative tool, it is concluded that despite very different
traditions and diverging responses in different time frames, there seems to be a gradual
convergence of public broadcasting policies and practices in Flanders and the Netherlands
in line with the new, more market oriented media policy of the European Union.
TWO VERY DIFFERENT MODELS AT FIRST
This article looks into the policies in Flanders and the Netherlands with regard to similar
tendencies putting pressure on the public broadcaster’s position in an increasingly
competitive landscape in which actors with opposing interests are playing. Audience
fragmentation, new suppliers and business models, a greater emphasis on branding and
marketing, severe budget cuts and limits on advertising income and new financing sources
are some of the major challenges that public broadcasters are facing. The aptness of public
broadcasters in Flanders and the Netherlands to face these challenges will be assessed,
taking trends in national policy into account. Attention will be paid to their respective
missions, quality provisions, and funding mechanisms.  
Flanders is the northern part of Belgium whose complex political structure has
undergone significant changes over the past 25 years. The country comprises three regions
(the Flemish, Walloon and Brussels Capital) and three Communities (the Flemish, French-
speaking and German-speaking), each with its own legislative and executive institutions.
The federal government is exercising power in national affairs. The public broadcasting
structure, paralleling the evolution within the structure of the Belgian state, went through
the shift from a unitary to a fully federalized model (Antoine, d’Haenens & Saeys, 2001).
The Netherlands has a peculiar tradition with respect to broadcasting closely related to
the country’s overall socio-political structure of the past century (Bardoel, 2008a). The
Dutch system of ‘segmented pluralism’ (Hallin & Mancini, 2004: 53) or ‘pillarization’
(Bardoel, 2001) in which social groups and civil society play a vital role represents an
alternative to media systems relying mainly on the state or the market. Currently, over
twenty public broadcasting organizations share three television channels and five radio
stations. However, this Dutch model of external pluralism is eroding rapidly and is starting
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to resemble to the more centralized structure of national public broadcasters anywhere else
in Europe.
In both countries the mainstream political parties, especially the Christian-democratic
and social-democratic formations, tend to be in favor of a broad public broadcaster
providing a varied supply including culture, information, educational and entertainment
content, except for the liberal parties whose vision is rather directed towards a
complementary channel with a limited reach and a program supply responding to market
failure, providing content considered as not economically viable by the commercial
counterparts.
A recent typology of Western media systems that caught considerable attention and
appreciation was proposed by Hallin and Mancini (2004). Resulting from their comparison
of media and political systems in most countries of Western Europe and North America, the
authors develop three ‘ideal types’: 1) the ‘liberal model’, mainly to be found in Great
Britain and its former British colonies (United States, Ireland, and Canada) with strong
media markets, high journalistic professionalism and a well organized but limited
Government intervention; 2) the ‘polarized pluralist model’ with considerable levels of
politicization, State intervention and clientelism in Mediterranean countries like France,
Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece; and 3) the ‘democratic corporatist model’ in the
Scandinavian countries, the Netherlands, Austria, Switzerland, Belgium and Germany with
high journalistic professionalism and consensual political systems that strongly rely on the
role of organized social groups in society, as opposed to a more individualistic concept of
representation in the liberal model. Hallin and Mancini hypothesize that these three models
will gradually converge to the liberal model of media policy, due to dominant trends such
as globalization and neoliberalism and, closely related to this, the increasing influence of
the European Union liberalization policies. Also other authors note the tendency to stimulate
a market-oriented approach at both the national and, first and foremost, EU level (Bardoel,
2007; Steemers, 2003; Murdock & Golding, 1999). Whereas Hallin and Mancini compare
media and political systems ‘tout court’ for most countries of the Western world, in this
contribution we will focus on the public broadcasting system in the two countries that
constitute the Dutch language domain of altogether 23 million citizens in Europe. Public
broadcasting is, according to Hallin and Mancini (2004, p. 43) “the most important form of
state ownership of media.” Due to our much narrower focus we will not use the set of
dimensions that Hallin and Mancini have chosen in their comparative analysis (structure of
media markets, political parallelism, professionalization and the role of the state), but
instead analyze aspects that specifically relate to the broadcasting policy domain such as the
recent, external transformations in the television market and in the nature of state
intervention, and more internally the changes in the mission, program task, quality control
and funding of public service broadcasters in both countries). In the concluding sections we
will come back to the main dimensions used by Hallin and Mancini, notably the evolution
of media markets, the role of the state and the level of political parallelism.
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At first glance both Flanders and the Netherlands seem to fit into the ‘democratic
corporatist’ model with a high level of segmented pluralism. The difference is however that
in the Netherlands this societal structure is also reflected in the broadcasting system,
whereas Belgium, and Flanders in particular, has chosen a unitary, BBC-like public
broadcasting system in its respective language communities. An interesting question in this
context is whether and to what extent the convergence towards a liberal model observed by
Hallin and Mancini also applies to broadcasting policies and practices in both countries.
This would imply not only that broadcasting policies in both countries converge, but also
that the Dutch tend to follow the Flemish model rather than the other way around.
This article’s main argument is built around the identification of a clear tendency
towards convergence between the Flemish and the Dutch public broadcaster’s policies and
practices. Originally, i.e. in the monopoly era, two very different models — the highly
politicized, polarized pluralist model in Flanders versus the corporatist model in the
Netherlands — have been looking at one another, each serving as the source of inspiration
for the other at different occasions. This ‘mirorring’ practice may have resulted in a
converging movement towards the EU model, not in the least enforced by the European
Commission’s interventionist policies as of the end of the 1980s.
DIFFERENT REACTIONS TO COMMERCIAL COMPETITORS
Since its launch in the 1920s, the Flemish public broadcaster evolved from a polarized
pluralist model with a high level of state intervention and politicization, similar to the
Mediterranean broadcasting tradition (Saeys & Antoine, 2007), to a democratic corporatist
model with a public broadcaster following a BBC-like model. The Dutch public broadcaster,
on the contrary, characterized by cautious political intervention, has been since its beginning
a decentral, externally pluralist broadcasting system allowing for internally homogenous
organizations responding to ideological and religious movements in civil society. Table 1
looks into the strength of the market position of the main players after over a decade of co-
existence of the public broadcaster alongside commercial competitors.
Flanders: Aiming at a BBC-like Model
Broadcasting in Belgium can indeed be considered a prototype of broadcasting in
Western Europe, dominated for years by public broadcasting organizations drawing deeply
for their inspiration upon the ideas of the BBC. This situation changed profoundly at the end
of the 1980s, when European legislation became dominant and the monopoly of the public
broadcaster came to an end. When launched in February 1989 with a de iure monopoly
status for 18 years, the commercial channel VTM immediately gained 27 percent of the
viewers market. It became by far the most popular TV channel with a market share of 37
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percent by the end of the year, at the expense of the Dutch stations and both channels of the
Flemish public broadcaster. Despite the fact that the average Flemish viewer already had a
wide range of programs on the cable network, it was only in the 1990s that the viewers
market fragmented (Antoine, d’Haenens, & Saeys, 2001). The VTM monopoly on
advertising was ended de facto in February 1995 by the setting up of VT4, a subsidiary of
SBS (Scandinavian Broadcasting System), targeting Flemish viewers and Flemish
advertising. By broadcasting from Great Britain, it got around VTM’s monopoly on
advertising. Not only creaming off part of the advertising market, VT4  also forced VTM
to make investments to counter competition, such as setting up a second channel (Ka2). Both
stations initially hoped to reach a new audience by showing prestigious programs, but soon
had to adapt their policy because they failed to reach the expected audience. After a
dramatically low audience share in the beginning of the 1990s due to the launch of these
commercial newcomers, the public broadcaster went to great lengths rendering its
programming more attractive (Saeys & Van Baelen, 1996; De Bens & Paulussen, 2005).
Netherlands: An Externally Pluralist Model
The Netherlands has chosen a unique broadcasting system, commonly characterized as
pillarization (Lijphart, 1975). In this system, broadcasting was left to social movements that
had already established their own organizations in politics, education, health care, culture
and leisure (Bardoel, 2008a; Van der Haak & Van Snippenburg, 2001). Since the liberal
bourgeoisie dominated the state apparatus until the introduction of general elections at the
beginning of 20th century, three social groups, the orthodox protestants, the roman catholics
and the social-democrats, considered themselves underprivileged. They all hoped to gain
from this pillarization process that provided for a weak state and a strong civil society. The
ideological foundation for this strategy is to be traced back to the Calvinist and Catholic
social ideologies, which can be labeled respectively as ‘cultural sovereignty’ and
‘subsidiarity’ (the latter concept has obtained wider usage more recently in the context of
European integration). 
After the introduction of commercial television in the Netherlands, due to the new EU
Directive ‘Television without Frontiers’, in 1989, the Dutch government had to ‘reinvent’
its broadcasting policy in the 1990s. In a first response, commercial broadcasting via cable
was legalized, but public broadcasting had to be defined for the long term as well. As of
2008 three large parties dominate the Dutch television market (Bardoel, 2008b; Netherlands
Media Authority, 2002). Dutch commercial television is owned by foreign companies
enjoying minimum program obligations (Machet, Pertzinidou, & Ward, 2002) other than the
provisions of the European Television without Frontiers EC Directive. A total of 19 national
channels, ten generalist and operated by the three large groups (public, RTL- and SBS-
group) and nine thematic channels operated by other commercial broadcasters, make up the
current Dutch television market. In 2005 John de Mol, one of the founders of Endemol
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production company, launched a new channel Talpa that — despite high investments in
football and fiction - never became successful and was taken over by RTL in 2007 to
become the fourth RTL channel. Almost fifty percent of the program output of the public
channels contain information and education, while on commercial channels the proportion
of these program categories is about thirty percent. More than half of the programs on
commercial channels are fiction, and on the public channels this proportion is about twenty
per cent.
CO-EXISTENCE IN A COMMERCIAL ENVIRONMENT:
A CHANGING GOVERNMENT STANCE
By the end of the 1980s the response to the commercial competitors in the television
market in the two countries proved to be very different. On the one hand, the Flemish
government opened up the market in a limited fashion and helped organizing commercial
competition from within. Moreover, Flemish publishers were found ready to invest in
broadcasting activities. In the beginning, prospects were promising as the commercial
competitor could enjoy a monopoly and the public broadcaster’s audience figures were
consistently declining. It was only in 1995 that the overly politicized moloch of the public
broadcaster managed to properly fight back the terrifying prospect of becoming completely
redundant. The Dutch government’s intention, on the other hand, was first to postpone the
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arrival of commercial broadcasters as much as possible. Nevertheless, with the help of
European legislation, the Dutch broadcast landscape ended up being surrendered to foreign
parties (RTL group and SBS), with a very open market and high levels of competition as a
consequence. The Dutch public broadcaster was already familiar with a system of internal
competition and supplied entertainment including for the Flemish audience during the
monopoly era. This made that the urgency for drastic change was not felt all that much.
Changes in the program supply were felt necessary only by the end of the 1990s, due to a
gradually declining market share of the public broadcaster and the unconditioned soft-touch
legislative regime enjoyed by the commercial broadcasters. By way of comparison: by the
end of the 1990s, the VRT had become the example of a revitalized broadcaster, even at
EBU level, thanks to the successive introduction of management contracts with the
government as well as benchmarking practices. Clearly, the transformation from a
Mediterranean politicized to an Anglo-Saxon mixed model became a fact.
Flanders: Organizing the Competition from Within
The Act on Radio and Television Advertising of February 6, 1987 made it possible for
broadcasters to derive revenue also from advertising. Meanwhile, the Flemish government
passed the Cable Decree on January 28, 1987, which legally ended the monopoly of the
public broadcaster. Moreover, only one commercial TV company could be set up and
allowed to broadcast via the cable network and address as such the whole Flemish
population. In an effort to anticipate foreign stations targeting the Flemish market from
abroad, a number of limitations were built into the Cable Decree: foreign television stations
would only be allowed access to the cable if they broadcast in one of the languages of their
country of origin. This limitation was justified from a cultural point of view. In 1992,
however, the European Court of Justice ruled that these limitations were in conflict with art.
59 of the EC Treaty, as they were measures of economic protection. As a result, the
language stipulation was removed from the Cable Decree. The first commercial channel
VTM was required to provide a balanced and diversified set of programs that should consist
of information, education and entertainment. At first, it mainly focused on entertainment but
gradually invested more in information. In compliance with European legislation, VTM had
to reserve part of its viewing time for European productions. Moreover, the 1988
Performance Decree stipulated that, following a period of five years, half of VTM’s
programs should consist of Flemish cultural productions. No clear definition had been given
of what this meant precisely, so in 1994 a quota regulation was put in place. From then on,
news, games, sport, ads and teletext could no longer be considered as Flemish cultural
programs. 
The VRT and the Flemish government have periodically concluded management
contracts since 1997, stipulating the funding provisions for the next five years. The first
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contract was signed for the period 1997-2001, the second for the period 2002-2006. Such
a contract defines the tasks of the public broadcaster in terms of performance criteria and
measurable objectives, and fixes the funding required to attain these objectives (Saeys &
Antoine, 2007; Coppens & Saeys, 2006). The latest management contract was approved on
July 19, 2006, the public at large having been canvassed and the Media Council having
given its advice. The latter praised the way in which VRT was fulfilling its public tasks, but
was critical of the plans for digitization, arguing that Flanders has no need nor the financial
scope for the eight digital channels proposed. It was furthermore claimed that the plans for
digitization could not be reconciled with the public broadcaster’s essential tasks.  
The Public Service contract (2006) focuses on the linear and generalist nature of the
public broadcaster, which is to appeal to as wide an audience as possible. In addition, the
public broadcaster must also serve specific target groups. Furthermore, the contract
explicitly seeks to safeguard the Flemish anchoring of the broadcasting service. Finally,
VRT productions must be gradually digitized and the visibility of the public broadcaster on
digital platforms such as the Internet and mobile telephony must be ensured, although VRT
must not play an anticipatory role and must confine itself to reacting to the wishes and needs
of the audience. 
The new decree was passed on May 10, 2006. It gives priority to safeguarding the public
mission of the broadcaster but also aims to keep a watchful eye on the commercial sidelines
of the broadcasting service (which should support its public mission, generate their own
funding and not distort the market) and to put an end to any disputes about the respective
powers of the board of directors, the managing director and the management team. The
board of directors can in future be enlarged with three independent experts in the fields of
media policy and business management and becomes the same full-fledged body that private
companies have, i.e. a body that must be given a say in strategic decisions such as launching
thematic channels and entering upon partnership deals. Furthermore, the board can now also
take initiatives instead of being confined to a purely reactive role. 
Netherlands: Surrendering to Foreign Commercial Parties
With the arrival of private television in 1989, the government and the public
broadcasting system had to find a response to the new situation. The government’s new
policy followed a two-way track: in the first half of the 1990s, the authorities set out to
regulate domestic private broadcasting and to strengthen the public system. The second half
of the decade, media policy was focused on liberalization of the various media sectors.
These changes led to numerous amendments of the Media Act, which was, as a result,
constantly ‘under construction’.
The public broadcasting system was first strengthened in financial terms. Advertising
opportunities were increased, and the licence fee was indexed to the increase in the cost of
living. Liberalization of the public broadcasting system resulted in five year concessions for
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all broadcasting organizations. Further attempts were made to strengthen the organization
of the public system as a whole by using a stronger central management. In 1998, a smaller
Board of Management, comprising three independent members, replaced the former (large)
NOS Board. Its task was to develop strategic plans and to be responsible for the total
programming output of the public system. For each television and radio station a network
co-ordinator was appointed with the task of giving the channels a more coherent identity.
The broadcasting associations remained responsible for radio and television programming.
Through a Supervisory Board they kept their influence over co-ordination measures,
financial plans and the network co-ordinators. 
Although the Media Act of 2000 left the fundamental basis of the Dutch public
broadcasting system unchanged, the central control of production, and particularly of
programming, was strengthened. The Executive Board of NOS and network coordinators
were given a key role in determining the general program policy, the network profiles and
the positioning of programs in the broadcasting schedules. The new Act also introduced a
‘double legitimacy’ for the public broadcasters based on a tiered system for separate
broadcasting associations and also for public broadcasting taken as a whole. The new
‘public accountability’ policy of public broadcasting (Bardoel & d’Haenens, 2004; Bardoel
& Brants, 2003) implies both external accountability measures through more public dialogue
and public assessment of performance (i.e. the review committee) and internal quality
control (i.e. a ‘quality card’). 
The Media Act of 2000 also introduced an evaluation of the performance of the public
broadcasting associations by an independent review committee every five years. The first
Public Broadcasting Review Committee (Visitatiecommissie, 2004; Bardoel, 2003) carried
out its evaluation and presented a report on the functioning of public broadcasting in April
2004. As its starting point the review assessed the self-assessment documents of the 20
broadcasting organizations that reported in the following areas: program overall
performance, audiences reached in terms of distinctiveness and accountability; the
organization’s efficiency, transparency and innovation. The committee concluded that,
taking public broadcasting associations individually, performance ranges from reasonable
to good. Mutual cooperation, however, was seriously inadequate. As a result, the program
schedule and the public reach fell short of the target of 40 percent market share. Important
groups such as the young, the less educated and ethnic minorities were not being sufficiently
reached by the public broadcaster. According to the committee, the cause of this situation
lied mainly in the managerial structure. There was too little focus on the audience and too
much attention on internal managerial problems within the system. 
Although advocated by some political parties and program-makers pressing for more
decisiveness, the committee did not opt for a national broadcasting structure like the BBC
or VRT, but for a compromise that would fit in with the specific Dutch broadcasting
tradition. In the political world, there was support for the committee’s critical analysis and
its sense of urgency. The Minister responsible for media passed a legislative proposal
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envisaging the development of a collective strategy for public broadcasters through
‘performance agreements’ both between broadcasting institutions and with the Government.
Also, the role of the Executive Board was further strengthened to secure a clear direction
for the programming on radio and television channels. Finally, a supervisory board,
independent of the executive of the broadcasting associations, was established as part of the
package of short-term reforms introduced by January 1, 2005.
CONVERGENCE AT THE LEVELS OF PSB MISSION AND PROGRAM TASK
Again, with a view to the BBC model of educating the audience, the VRT considered
itself the main cultural institution of the Flemish community. Its aim was to build the
Flemish cultural identity and to fulfill a cultural educational mission rooted in a strongly
paternalistic vision (Dhoest & Van den Bulck, 2007). This mission resulted in new fiction
program content, to a high extent commissioned to external independent producers. As such,
the VRT’s human capital is severely underused. Consequently, innovation comes
disproportionally from outside, and the VRT remains an expensive operation to sustain.
Buying in innovation from outside proved to be both the easiest and fastest way to change.
In the Netherlands the public broadcaster’s transition from a supply to a demand model
occurred by the end of the 1990s, as the urgency to change was felt later in the Dutch
context. At first the individual public broadcasting organizations were asked to comply with
a quota regulation as to the content they had to deliver. Only recently management contracts
are drawn up, and a so-called ‘money on schedule’ system is put in place in order to
discipline the entire public broadcaster’s programme supply. The portion of fiction on Dutch
public television remains significantly lower than on the commercial channels, according
to the European  (Table 2). 
FLANDERS: THE VRTAS LARGEST CULTURAL INSTITUTION
Only as of 1995 the public broadcaster was revitalized, both from an institutional and
a program output perspective. As to program supply, the general mission was to reach the
largest possible part of the Flemish population with a diversity of programs that could
arouse the interest of the viewers and listeners and meet their expectations. Information and
culture are considered key areas, but also sports, modern-style educational programs, home-
produced drama, tasteful entertainment, and youth and children’s programs are to be part
of the output. Quality remains key, in addition to universality and complementarity. A new
element was the commitment to achieve the goals set: the public broadcaster is to make its
mission explicit in a multi-year plan and to translate it into measurable goals. In the coming
years VRT will have to cope with three major challenges: internationalization, the
convergence of distribution and content, and digitization, the latter of which will result in
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thematic channels and programs for target groups. All VRT channels together need to
provide the audience with a wide and effective range of programs, and in so doing the public
broadcaster will no longer be able to resort to a net-specific approach since in a kind of on-
going interaction each VRT-net will continuously refer the viewer to the other nets. The
underlying idea is that VRT can offer Flemish society an extra value, notably by playing a
major connective role and furthering social cohesion by means of a mix of high-quality
programs of an informative, cohesive and instructive nature. The mission common to all
VRT brands is to appeal to as wide an audience as possible, irrespective of age, gender or
social group. This is quantified in criteria measuring the performance of the public
broadcaster in terms of coverage, made explicit in statements such as: at least 90 percent of
the population should listen to or view VRT programs on a monthly basis; newscasts and
information magazines (television and radio) should reach, on average, 60 percent of VRT
viewers per day (i.e. at least 25 percent of the program, linear or by request), and on average
80 percent of VRT listeners per day (i.e. at least ten consecutive minutes). 
Netherlands: Centralizing Forces at Work
The market share of the public broadcasting system over the past two decades looked
like a downhill sleigh ride: every new arrival in the commercial television market led to
decreasing market shares of the public system. The new Media Act of 2000 guarantees the
public system three television channels and five radio stations until 2010 (Media Act, 2000).
The Act places the task of providing public radio and television services in the hands of a
single concession holder, NOS (now NPO), which ensures that licensed broadcasters, as
participants in the concession, jointly fulfill their statutory duty of providing high-quality
and diverse programming which reaches both large and small sections of the Dutch
population. To this end, NPB accounts for the way in which the public broadcasting system
performs its tasks in a ‘concession policy plan’ (published to obtain a ten-year concession,
see NOS, 2000), and in its annual budgets. An extensive review will be carried out after five
years to determine whether broadcasting associations can remain within the public system.
Content requirements for the public system were tightened in order to safeguard a clear
distinction from the offerings of the private sector. At least 35 percent of programs must
comprise information and education, at least 25 percent culture (half of which is for arts),
and no more than 25 percent (per channel) entertainment. Furthermore 50 percent must be
European production, 50 percent subtitled for the hearing-impaired, and 25 percent
commissioned (independent) production. Public service broadcasting must serve as a
guarantee for variety and quality in programming. Every five years an independent review
committee assesses the performance of public broadcasters.
 In its Policy Plan for the years 2007-2011 the Executive Board of Netherlands Public
Broadcasting defines as its mission “to be there of and for everybody and to bond Dutch
society with programs that inform, inspire and entertain.” The old supply model, in which
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each of the three TV channels were ‘filled’ by three broadcasting organizations - producing
a Christian-oriented Nederland 1, a popular Nederland 2 and a progressive Nederland 3 -
was replaced by a model in which the Executive Board took over the authority to program
all TV channels. The new, more viewer-oriented programming model resembles the practice
in most neighboring countries, including Flanders, in which the first ‘broadening’ general
interest channel is supplemented by a more special-interest, ‘deepening’ second channel.
The third channel is explicitly geared towards a younger audience, which means — in a PSB
context — younger than 50 years old. Research figures show that especially the first
network, that became market leader at the expense of RTL1, and the third network, that
actually attracts more young viewers, are successful. Consequently, the public opinion
climate in the Netherlands vis-à-vis public service broadcasting has become more favorable
in recent years.
FUNDING MECHANISMS
Also in terms of  total revenue (in absolute figures), the Flemish and Dutch public
broadcaster’s situation diverges considerably (Table 3). Flanders follows the example of the
BBC funding model: a license fee which has become part of taxes and limited advertising
(sponsoring, a grey area, is allowed to a certain ceiling). The Dutch model follows a mixed
funding model of taxes (formerly a license fee) combined with advertising income.  
Flanders
As the most important part of the public broadcaster’s income continues to come from
the government grant, to be increased annually by four percent if the goals set in the contract
are met — it is obvious that the government wants to monitor the accomplishment of the
goals to be met. The management contract provides, for the year 2007 and for the entire
duration of the contract, a basic grant with which the public broadcaster should be able to
carry out its public mission. In 2007 VRT received 279 million Euros; by 2011, allowing
for a rise in wage costs, that sum will amount to 293.3 million Euros. In addition, a sum of
3.8 million Euros is provided for research and innovation in 2007; in 2012 this amount will
rise to 4.1 million Euros. The contract also stipulates that VRT may enjoy supplementary
revenues, e.g., from the private sector and from the sector of subsidized arts, to the benefit
of the cultural channel. In contrast, revenue from radio commercials is limited to 40.9
million Euros annually. As to revenue from television sponsoring and partnerships, a limit
is imposed of 8.7 million Euros and from 2008 onwards a maximum of 4.5 million Euros
annually. It should be mentioned that, notwithstanding the at times acrimonious comments
from both the political decision-makers and the public broadcaster in the Spring and
Summer of 2006 in the preparation period towards a new decree and the renewal of the
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management contract, the Flemish public broadcaster could always count on a lot of
goodwill from all political parties, leaving aside the known sensitivities among for instance
right-wing parties regarding the spending of public funds on public service broadcasting
programs aimed at large audiences. 
The Netherlands
The license fee was abolished on January 1, 2000 and replaced with a levy on income
taxes. This shift in funding mechanism ‘fiscalized’ the Dutch public broadcasters. Only a
few years after the change it is apparent that the public broadcasters have become more
dependent on the government of the day. Between 2003 and 2008, the budget is also being
reduced up to a total of 80 million Euro per year as part of the austerity measures introduced
by the Dutch government. In 2005 the media budget of the Dutch government amounted to
850 million Euros; 640 million Euros came out of taxation and 210 million Euros out of
advertising income and interest. Thus, about three quarters of the budget come from
taxation, and one quarter from advertising revenues. Sponsoring by third parties is estimated
to contribute 20 million Euros per year. Overall the public broadcasting system receives a
total budget of 675 million Euro, of which 535 million Euros are allocated to television.
Each Dutch citizen pays approximately 45 Euros annually, which is well below the
European average paid for public service television of 75 Euros per year. 
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CONCLUSIONS: WHITHER 
PUBLIC BROADCASTING IN THE LOW COUNTRIES?
Overall, European politics and public broadcasting alike are in the middle of a process
of reinventing the concept of public service broadcasting and to reconsider if and to what
extent the existing institutions are still serving the idea of public service broadcasting as it
was formulated over 80 years ago. As was illustrated at length in the above sections on the
public broadcasters in Flanders and the Netherlands, these tremendous societal changes have
not automatically led to uniformity, nor has commercialization led to extreme simplification
or a unified western broadcasting model. Even within the European Union one cannot speak
of a uniform broadcasting model. 
In the 1980s and 1990s more commercialization led to competition and content
convergence between the commercial channels and the public broadcaster, with a huge
identity crisis as a result for the latter. Meanwhile, better times have come along for the
public broadcasters, as after two decades of dual broadcasting in Europe, the demise of
public service broadcasting is far from as serious as forecast. In recent years, public
broadcasters in some European countries, including Flanders and even the Netherlands,
managed to regain public attention or program rights they had lost to their commercial
counterparts, although the basic problems of public broadcasting concerning mission and
funding are still numerous.
Looking at the contexts within which both public broadcasters have worked on their
transition in Flanders and the Netherlands, as summarized in Table 4, clearly different
institutional choices were made. Also in the introduction of a dual broadcasting system
different choices were made. In the Netherlands the main political actors — the social-
democratic party and, more importantly, the Christian-democratic party — have prevented
the coming of commercial broadcasting until European legislation, i.e. the EC Directive
“Television without Frontiers,” made this policy impossible. As a result, national initiatives
for commercial television were blocked and commercial broadcasting eventually fell in the
hands of foreign owners, RTL and SBS. In Flanders national publishing houses played a key
role in the introduction of commercial broadcasting (currently two Flemish publishing
companies, Roularta and the Persgroep, each have a 50 percent share in VTM). Therefore,
the Flemish commercial television market can be characterized by strong national ownership
and moderate competition, whereas the Dutch market combines foreign ownership with
fierce competition. It also illustrates once again that neighboring countries with comparable
political formations and similar ‘consensus politics’ (see Lijphart (1984, 1999) in Hallin &
Mancini, 2004: 51) can yet produce very different media policies. 
At present, Dutch public broadcasting still has the handicap of a decentralized structure
that makes it difficult to respond to new challenges, coming from commercial competitors
earlier on as well as from cross media providers more recently. Politics and public
Converging PSB Policies in Western Europe Jo L. H. Bardoel and Leen d’Haenens
Journal of Global Mass Communication, Vol. 1, Nos. 3/4 (Summer/Fall 2008)  205
broadcasting have been trying to modernize and centralize the system in order to make it fit
for the future already for fifteen years now, but due to a lack of consensus, between the
political and the public broadcasting system and also within the Hague and Hilversum, only
slow progress is made, and often ambitious policy plans are followed by limited action. In
Flanders, there are just two main actors, the Flemish government and the unitary public
broadcaster VRT that weal and deal with each other, mainly through negotiations and
management contracts, and where public broadcasting tries to gain more autonomy in order
to get away from a tradition of political interference and clientelism that reminds of the
Mediterranean policy model. As of 1995 the Flemish public broadcaster has been successful
in realizing an almost total make-over, from a highly politicized and bureaucratic BRT to
a much more audience-oriented and flexible VRT. In both countries the level of political
parallelism (Hallin & Mancini, 2004, p. 30-31) has decreased considerably over the past two
decades, in the Netherlands because of a power shift from the ‘pillarized’ broadcasting
associations, with traditionally close relations with their respective political parties, to the
central NPO with a more impartial management orientation, and in Flanders due to the
introduction of management contracts and other ‘arms length’ policy instruments.
Consequently the broadcasting systems in both countries have come closer together, and
also the roles between Dutch and Flemish public broadcasting have been reversed. Both
systems have moved from a democratic corporatist, or in the Belgian tradition even state-
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orientation, to a more liberal model. And where in the past the Dutch PSB model was often
seen as an example to be followed in Flanders, now VRT policies are often considered as
good practices for Dutch broadcasting (e.g., the introduction of life style groups and
psychographic research as a basis for program scheduling). All this means that public
service broadcasting policies and practices in both neighbouring countries are gradually
growing towards each other into a stronger centralized model with checks and balances, as
well as performance criteria and agreements. In this case, Hallin and Mancini’s hypothesis
that the three different broadcasting policy models in Europe will gradually converge into
the liberal model, based on a bigger distance between governments and public broadcasters
with more strict supervision and checks and balances, certainly seems to apply. At the same
time, and this is also in line with Hallin and Mancini’s cautiously formulated hypothesis,
each broadcasting model will maintain its own intrinsicalities, taking reigning cultural and
political sensitivities into account for at least the next decade. 
Finally, we should not forget that during the period for which we have compared public
broadcasting policies in two neighboring countries European media policy has gained
prominence. In the initial phase of what we might label, referring to Van Cuilenburg and
McQuails typology (2003), the public service policy period, public service broadcasting was
not an issue on the European level, but a national matter entirely. At the same time, public
service broadcasting was the cornerstone of a shared European media policy tradition
dedicated to the public interest. Roughly this tradition stems from the interbellum and
reached its apex somewhere between 1970 and 1980. According to Michalis (2007, p. 277)
this has to be understood “in the context of the postwar Keynesian national state order
characterized by an interventionist managerial state, relatively closed national economies,
the predominantly national organization of capital and close government-industry relations.”
Public broadcasters were designed to serve democracy, culture and social cohesion of
societies, and their output was associated with standards such as independence, diversity,
quality and reach. For a long time Western European countries shared such general ideals
about broadcasting, although their actual systems differed (Bardoel, 2007). 
In the 1980s and 1990s, however, the broadcasting sector was affected by rapid
technological changes, leading to a proliferation of channels, distributed across national
borders. This spurred the liberalization of the broadcasting sector, making it subject to the
common market. The European Union had taken its first initiatives in the field of media and
communication in the 1970s, but these were, according to Michalis (2007), rather a response
to general international developments than part of a comprehensive policy plan. In the mid-
and late 1980s, the EU managed to enter the field of ICT, telecommunications and
television, and thus gradually became an important actor. The original aim to use the advent
of transfrontier television for democratic ideals and to create a direct link between the EU
and its citizens was rapidly overshadowed by cultural and industrial policy considerations
at a time when the broadcasting market was transforming from public and national to private
and transnational. By and large, most Western European countries remained very supportive
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of public service broadcasting. Yet, the public interest became defined in economic terms
too, such as technological innovation, openness and transparency of ownership, maximum
access and choice for consumers (Jakubowicz, 2003). 
More recently public service broadcasting has become affected by competition law and
state aid rules of the EC Treaty. According to Collins (1999, p. 162) “the internal market is
hostile to public service broadcasting (…) as seen from the vantage point of the neo-
classical economic theory underpinning the EEC Treaty, public service is aberrant and
offensive.” Harcourt (2005) draws the conclusion that EU media market regulation has been
unable to expand the boundaries of the EU as a regulatory state, also due to a lack of
political backing of member state governments. Consequently, “the European Commission
remains constrained by the Treaties to a reliance on economic arguments, which are unable
to take on board public interest concerns.” (2005, p. 202). “The question is,” Bardoel and
Lowe (2007, 12) conclude, “how the European Union can so blithely treat PSB from a
deterministically economic perspective when the entire enterprise isn’t about that and is in
fact explicitly about the countervailing importance of the socio-cultural dimension. How can
PSB be treated as an ‘exception’ when it is so obviously central to the European media
ecology and a European invention that remains a cultural institution that greatly contributes
to the heritage and richness of European social life?” The traditional model of European
public service broadcasting as we have seen it in two different national contexts seems to
become an endangered species in the context of the European Union. 
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